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14 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion in General Carter's Office at 1430 Hours,  
14 November Regarding OXCART Surfacing

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1. Another meeting on OXCART surfacing was held in General Carter's office on the date above, attended by Dr. Wheeler, [redacted] and the undersigned. A rough draft of a proposed background paper on the history of the OXCART program was circulated to those present for discussion and to see if the format met General Carter's approval.

2. General Carter began by saying that on 12 November the Director and the President had a meeting in the White House, alone, on the subject of surfacing OXCART. In response to the Director's question as to what his reactions were towards such a possible move, General Carter said that the President stated he did not want the OXCART surfaced, at least until we were sure that it would not be employed operationally and even then any surfacing had to be in the best interest of the U. S. He further added, according to General Carter, that when and if the time came to make such a decision he alone would do it.

3. General Carter then read a memo from Dr. Fubel which delivered at some length a proposed DOD format calling for the surfacing of the R-12 and in such detail as to include the actual date (15 January 1964) at which point the R-12 would be surfaced in an open press conference following a congressional and industrial briefing in advance. General Carter said that

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Dr. Zubin's memo had become obsolete and that the Director had laid upon him, General Carter, the full responsibility for drawing up a detailed plan which would identify the steps and procedures to be used in OXCART surfacing; that the Director had told him to work this out with Dr. Zubin and then give the plan to him, the Director, who would then in all possibility discuss it with the President and possibly put it in the "deep freeze" at the White House (or use at such time as a surfacing might be required or indicated).

4. In general, the DCI was not displeased with the draft memorandum on the background of the OXCART program, but he said he felt it required considerable additional detail and fleshing out before it could be considered acceptable. For example, he said that nowhere in the first page did he make any mention of the initiative which CIA took in considering a follow-on to the U-2 which was the impetus behind the OXCART. General Carter said that he wished the following sort of things emphasized:

a. The CIA initiative in OXCART

b. The use of the sole source techniques and methods in implementing OXCART after the design competition phase.

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5. The reasoning to doing this is to give us the fullest record possible from which we can then make proper judgments as to which elements of the total OXCART project envelope must NOT be surfaced.

6. As an addendum to this background paper, the General would like to have a consolidated staff recommendation on these

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aspects of the OXCART program which we should continue to protect even in the event the program is surfaced as a CIA venture. This addendum should be grounded in the premise that the Agency will retain control of the OXCART program as a clandestine intelligence collection mechanism even following such surfacing were it to take place. In this regard, I suggest that we start from the listing developed as an attachment to [redacted] 1075-63, dated 10 January 1961, and addressed from AD/OSA to the Director of Security, entitled "Information which must continue to be protected under Project OXCART subsequent to the surfacing of the X-12/R-X Program". [redacted] Mr. Parangosky, and [redacted] should combine to develop such a staff recommendation, calling upon other elements of OSA as appropriate.

7. General Carter said that although the immediate time pressure was somewhat relaxed in terms of imminent surfacing, both he and the Director wanted this effort to proceed with all haste possible so that the basic work could be done in time for Mr. McCone to have it in hand before going to Honolulu with the Secretary of Defense next week. [redacted] agreed to furnish the undersigned with a copy of Dr. Rubini's letter of approximately 4 November referred to above, and Dr. Whetton agreed to attempt to obtain from Dr. Rubini a copy of the Air Force proposal which, if adopted, would have centered the surfacing effort on the A-12 as a protection for the A-11.

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